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From Ethnographic Knowledge to Anthropological Intelligence:  
An Anthropologist in the Office of Strategic Services in Second World War 
Africa 
 
This article explores the overlapping modalities and practical purposes of anthropological 
ethnographic knowledge and political-military intelligence gathering – the commonalities as well 
as the boundaries between them – through an analysis of the career of the anthropologist Jack 
Sargent Harris (1912-2008), a secret operative for the United States’ Office of Strategic Services 
(OSS) during World War II in Nigeria and South Africa. Calling upon archival and oral historical 
sources, the article relates Harris’s training in Boasian cultural anthropology and as a 
professional ethnographer of African societies and cultures to the ways he recruited informants, 
conducted surveillance, related to foreign Allied officials, utilized documentary evidence, and 
worked to establish authority and credibility in his wartime intelligence reporting. The article 
argues that political purpose is a central artifact of anthropological ethnography as it is in other 
ethnographic modalities even if the justifications for these endeavours remain distinct.      
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It was 5 June 1944. Half a world away Allied intelligence organizations were concealing the 
impending invasion of Normandy, but in South Africa another counter-espionage war was 
unfolding. Driving the 1942 Dodge sedan was Heimer “Tiny” Anderson, an Afrikaans-speaking 
former army officer described as being “six feet seven inches, … about 240 pounds, not an ounce of 
which [was] surplus fat, though … ‘solid ivory from the shoulders up’”. The passengers were Jack 
Sargent Harris of the secret United States Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and Oren Stephens of 
the US Office of War Information. They were going to see Dr. Johannes (Hans) Frederik Janse Van 
Rensburg, once a senior state official but now the leader of the Ossewabrandwag (OB),
1
 a pro-Nazi 
Afrikaner extra-parliamentary mass movement. The OB openly resisted the government and South 
Africa’s involvement in the war, and spread anti-Semitic, anti-capitalist, and anti-democratic 
propaganda. Van Rensburg traversed the country addressing audiences, covertly supported sabotage 
against strategic infrastructure, and secretly collaborated with Axis spies in Southern Africa.
2
 
Crossing a narrow stream en route to Van Rensburg’s farm northwest of Pretoria, Anderson, 
the OB leader’s assistant-cum-bodyguard, scoffed that this was “the famous [Aapies] river” 
Winston Churchill boasted of swimming to escape internment during the South African War. 
Anderson, the Americans inferred, “impl[ied] that Churchill – and all Englishmen – talk big about 
little accomplishments”. The OB, however, craved publicity in English-language outlets, which is 
2 
 
why its leader would receive them. Van Rensburg wanted Americans to know about his movement 
and regretted that an interview he had given Life magazine was never published.
3
 
 For Harris, under cover as the Special Assistant to the US minister to the Union of South 
Africa, this was a chance to penetrate an organization that OSS and British Intelligence considered 
the source of their many difficulties in Southern Africa.
4
 One difficulty was that OB harbour 
workers exploited poor port security to obtain information about Allied shipping – the cause, it was 
believed, of many ships rounding southern Africa being sunk by U-boats (Harris 1991; Turner, 
Gordon-Cumming, and Betzler 1961). Second, OB sabotage, industrial espionage and theft, armed 
robbery, diamond smuggling, and civil service infiltration had subverted South Africa’s war effort 
by lowering economic output, limiting the fighting forces the government could risk sending abroad 
without compromising internal security, and in other ways supporting the enemy (Bunting 1964; 
Hagemann 1992). Third, the OB protected German wireless operators within South Africa in 
contact with Berlin, and maintained cross-border human communication channels with Axis 
regional espionage networks headquartered in neutral Portuguese Mozambique (Fedorowich 2005; 
Harrison 2007). Finally, Harris and his British colleagues’ efforts to have the couriers and wireless 
operators arrested were impeded by the South African Police, whose chief detective, Colonel 
Coetzee, they suspected of collusion with Van Rensburg and the OB (Chavkin 2009, 186-266; 
Shear 2013). “Thus it was a European nationalist movement that The OB, in short, “posed the main 
internal threat to South Africa’s war effort” (Jackson 2006, 251). 
 Why Prime Minister Jan Smuts’s government tolerated all this and refused to touch Van 
Rensburg perplexed many, as the opening paragraph of Harris and Stephens’s report of their five-
hour meeting with the OB leader emphasized: 
 
The most striking of the many anomalies of the Union of South Africa is the fact that while it 
is allied with the other United Nations in the fight to the finish against Hitlerism, it permits its 
local brand of Hitlerism to thrive virtually unchecked. Still on the loose are its local “fuehrer” 
and all but a few of his followers, although their declared objective is the overthrow by 
revolutionary means of the government now in power. The incredulous observer from abroad 
finds that while loyal “Springboks” are fighting and dying to destroy the Nazis of Europe, the 
Nazis of South Africa are carrying on with only slight interference their campaign to establish 




Smuts’s forbearance was explained at the time in terms that are still rehearsed: the OB’s antics 
discredited all his anti-war Afrikaner nationalist opponents, inside parliament and out; Van 
Rensburg was secretly working for Smuts, or at least was a moderating influence on his more 
extremist followers because he feared to lead an open rebellion and counted on an Axis victory to 
bring him to power; Smuts’s hold on the machinery of state was so tenuous that he dared not 
suppress the OB, intern Van Rensburg, or even allow Allied intelligence agencies to engage too 
vigorously in counter-intelligence because of what they might expose about his weaknesses. 
Increasingly, the British and Americans favoured the last of these explanations. 
Arriving in southern Africa in September, 1943, following postings in Nigeria and at OSS’s 
Washington headquarters, Harris had joined agents of Britain’s MI5, MI6 and Special Operations 
Executive (SOE) in efforts to capture the German wireless operators the OB was protecting and 
thereby uncover sufficiently incriminating evidence about Van Rensburg’s role to force Smuts to 
act against the movement and its leader. Repeated failure, for which they blamed Coetzee’s police, 
led the British to withdraw by May, 1944 (Shear 2013). Left alone in the field, Harris sought new 
ways to further his counter-espionage brief – among them, this chance alongside Stephens to 
observe Van Rensburg in his own milieu, where South Africa’s “local ‘fuehrer’” would perhaps 




produce new knowledge – “to bring the entire subject up to date, while duplicating … earlier 
reports [on Van Rensburg and the OB] as little as possible”.6 
Harris, 31, although in appearance “much older”,7 had a Ph.D. in anthropology from 
Columbia University and was teaching at Ohio State University when the United States entered the 
war. Expressly recruited by OSS for his ethnographic skills, developed in field research among 
Native Americans and West Africans, Harris retained his identity as an anthropologist. He and 
Stephens, a journalist in peacetime,
8
 would have to write persuasively yet dispassionately about 
their encounter with Van Rensburg. For Harris, the report would draw deeply on his training in 
producing ethnographic knowledge – adducing evidence of a profound grasp of context rooted in 
“witnessing”, being “on the scene”, and obtaining “the native’s” point of view – not to meet 
standards of scholarly evaluation but to generate intelligence that compelled action.
9
 Smuts, a keen 
reader of ethnographies and author of forewords to many of the classics of South African 
anthropology, would be shown the report.
10
 And while it would not have the full effect Harris 
desired, the report would achieve more than the British and Americans’ earlier efforts, which had 
left Smuts unmoved.  
Harris’s recourse to the techniques of his academic training in his intelligence work 
illuminates anthropology’s relationship to governance differently from literature foregrounding the 
discipline’s instrumentality. After the First World War, Franz Boas, the founder of modern North 
American anthropology, excoriated anthropologists who had “prostituted science by using it as a 
cover for their activities as spies” (quoted in Price 2008, 16). While endorsing this view during the 
interwar period, many American anthropologists served in their professional capacity in the Second 
World War, notably in the OSS (Allen 2011; Price 2004; Mandler 2009a), and contributed to 
operations abroad subsequently, albeit less prominently from the 1950s onwards. Concerns, though, 
about the instrumentality and instrumentalization of anthropology in the service of power continue 
to inform the discipline practically and theoretically (American Anthropological Association 2012). 
For more sceptical critics, anthropology became an academic discipline alongside the expansion of 
universalist technologies of domination, negotiating the identities of local populations and rational 
observers. For them, ethnography was inescapably a method of both domination and self-control. 
Shaped equally by the specific circumstances of the field, and by modern methods and disciplines 
that envisioned the unknown as a field, the boundary between ethnography and colonial intelligence 
was, such critics argue, superficial (Pels 1997, 165, 167). 
Harris’s case permits detailed consideration, beyond generalisation and speculative 
analogising, of whether ethnography and intelligence gathering are intellectually and practically 
cognate pursuits. It is a window onto a specific period’s intellectual history and a single 
anthropologist’s actions and writings in these two spheres, casting new light on the relationships 
between ethnography and the production of governmentality and difference. Harris’s wartime use of 
his ethnographic skills drew on exceptional personal repertoires of reserve and empathy, and a 
particular hatred of Nazism, but his experience resonates with that of better known mentors and 
colleagues, including Margaret Mead. Perhaps in challenging consensual understandings of the 
relationship between ethnography and intelligence, Harris’s work is the exception that proves the 
rule. Even so, his case points to the limits of analyses emphasising a simple subsumption of 
anthropology into politics. Harris’s life and work in the 1930s and 1940s – spanning North America 
and opposite ends of Africa, and revealed in his scholarly articles, personal and professional letters 
from the field, research notes and diaries, and operational dispatches – permit reconsideration of the 
politically transformative potential of ethnography. 
 
Making of the Anthropologist 
 
Although Harris came to anthropology circuitously, his background resembled that of other 
graduate students in Columbia University’s Anthropology Department in the 1930s. Born Jacob 
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Herscovitz in 1912, Harris was the third of six surviving children of Jewish immigrants from 
Romania who owned a small Chicago grocery store over which the family lived.
11
 They inhabited a 
neighbourhood of mostly Polish, Italian, and Irish Catholic immigrants, for whom Jews were “the 
despised minority”. Harris wanted “desperately” to conform to a white “full American” ideal, 
causing him initially to consider “other peoples”, particularly African Americans, “inferior”. His 
brother, sensitive to anti-Semitism, suggested that the family anglicize its name; “Sargent”, Harris’s 
middle name, came from a novel (Yelvington 2008, 450-451, 453). 
 After high school, Harris worked for a publisher, but with few prospects once the 
Depression began in 1929 he moved to New York and became a merchant sailor. For nearly three 
years, he went around the world, doing “stupid reckless things …, going over the side or climbing a 
mast in a rough sea” as he experienced his body transform into a strong young man’s and with it a 
sense of masculinity entailing risk-taking, self-reliance, respect for but a need to obviate established 
authority, and sexual confidence. Returning to Chicago, Harris, at a friend’s suggestion, and aided 
by student loans, and work-study and off-campus employment, enrolled at Northwestern University, 
a “rich man’s school” (Yelvington 2008, 451). A class with Melville J. Herskovits, an 
anthropologist, student of Franz Boas, and a specialist in African and Afro-American cultures, 
“hooked” him on anthropology (Edelman 1997, 8). 
He took every course he could with Herskovits, to whom Harris’s experience and 
worldliness, unusual in an undergraduate, appealed. Herskovits granted Harris special privileges, 
inviting him to the Faculty Club for lunch and to sit in on graduate seminars where he met the 
dancer-ethnographer Katherine Dunham (then a Ph.D. student), and visiting scholars like the 
Howard University political scientist Ralph J. Bunche and Cambridge physical anthropologist Jack 
Trevor. He became friends with William R. Bascom, who was preparing to do doctoral fieldwork in 
Nigeria, and went with Willard Z. Park, anthropology faculty at Northwestern at the time, to jazz 
clubs on Chicago’s south side where theirs were often the only white faces in the crowd 
(Yelvington 2008, 453). Continuing to work on merchant ships between sessions, Harris sent long, 
descriptive letters to Herskovits from ports around the world. A 1935 letter written between Naples 
and Alexandria, evocatively describing Italian soldiers boarding troopships bound for the invasion 




 From Herskovits, Harris imbibed the Boasian paradigm, retrospectively known as “historical 
particularism” (Harris 1968, Ch. 9), which discarded evolutionism for the idea that each group, or 
“culture”, had a singular historical development not comparable to any other. For Boas, cultural 
lifeways were explicable by environmental conditions, psychological factors, and above all 
historical processes. One culture might influence another, but the strength of each culture’s Geist 
meant that borrowed elements were moulded to the contours of the receiving culture. This was a 
cultural-centric, or “culturalist”, approach where “culture” was often both explanandum and 
explanans, but it did much to replace “race” in accounting for human behaviour. Methodologically, 
the Boasian approach committed anthropologists to long-term fieldwork, learning indigenous 
languages, and collecting historical materials such as folklore. Native Americans – whose cultures 
ethnographers felt pressed to “salvage” (Gruber 1970) before white encroachment displaced them 
altogether – were obvious subjects. Cultural relativism – the insistence that no one culture was 
superior to or worthier of study than another, that invidious comparisons were unscientific and 
dangerous, and that anthropology could combat nativism and racism – was what Boas taught the 
first generation of anthropologists in the United States who went on to found university 
anthropology departments, including Herskovits (Baker 2010; Darnell 1998, 2001; Gilkeson 2010; 
Hyatt 1990; Patterson 2001; Stocking 1974). Having initially advanced the assimilationist argument 
that African Americans had fully acculturated to mainstream “American culture”, Herskovits spent 
his career charting what he called “Africanisms” – African cultural “survivals” in the New World 




and especially religion (Apter 1991; Gershenhorn 2004; Jackson 1986; Price and Price 2003; Scott 
1991; Yelvington 2006, 2011). Championing cultural relativism, Herskovits earned praise for 
studying African Americans seriously and attacking prejudice in the palpable inter-war racist and 
nativist atmosphere. The Myth of the Negro Past, for example, maintained that rather than a deficit 
(of) culture, African Americans had a proud past in Africa’s ancestral cultures, extending back 
beyond slavery, and manifested in Africanisms which demonstrably contributed to American 
culture (Herskovits 1941). 
Herskovits’s cultural relativist and constructivist lectures on “race” had a “blinding effect” 
on Harris, who came to “understand the integrity of other cultures”, that “other peoples had their 
dignity”, and that he was a child of his own culture (Yelvington 2008:451, 453). One lecture 
defining Jews – Herskovits had trained to be a rabbi when young but gave it up – as those that 
others characterized as Jews (see Herskovits 1927; cf. Frank 2001; Yelvington 2000) impressed 
Harris, who would retain Herskovits’s cultural relativism and anti-racism, but whose formation in a 
working-class immigrant neighbourhood and as a seaman made him doubt the culturalist paradigm. 
He read the evolutionist Lewis Henry Morgan as well as Friedrich Engels’s Anti-Dühring. He wrote 
to Herskovits in October 1934 that while “rebel[ling] more against the ‘orthodox’ Marxian 
evolutionary pattern of society”, he “had always experienced a sullen rebellion against 
[Herskovits’s] teachings that culture, arising from a complex of conditions, is its own justification 
because it exists, …is capable of …an almost infinite number of forms[,] … that it follows no set 
evolutionary process”.13 
Two years later, at Columbia, Harris “still th[ought] that anthropology from the viewpoint of 
dialectical materialism would be a fruitful thing”.14 Many of his fellow graduate students were 
children of immigrants, Jewish, working-class, and steeped in radical political traditions; Harris 
himself supported industrial action by longshoremen and seamen (Madden 1999). Harris’s 
theoretical and political understanding was based in his practical experience: “I understood labor 
problems at first hand from my life as a seaman”, he said (quoted in Yelvington 2008, 455). 
Protestant students from rural or western, middle- to upper-class backgrounds contributed to a 
vibrant intellectual mix (McMillan 1986; Murphy 1991). Harris’s anthropological interest in the 
economic bases of society was encouraged by several of his teachers, including Alexander Lesser, 
who helped him see “natives as honest-to-God humans with work to do, with food to get and eat, 
who sweat and belch and fornicate”.15 
 Travel and Herskovits had stirred Harris’s interest in Africa; he took a course with the 
Belgian Africanist anthropologist Frans Olbrechts. Fieldwork funding was scarce during the 
Depression, however, and Harris had to accept what he was offered. Ralph Linton, the Columbia 
department’s chair, had contracted to edit a volume on “acculturation”. Linton, Herskovits, and the 
University of Chicago’s Robert Redfield, under the auspices of the Social Science Research Council 
(SSRC), had recently issued an influential “Memorandum for the Study of Acculturation” 
(Redfield, Linton, and Herskovits 1936; see, also, Herskovits 1938), which they defined as the 
adjustments, conflicts, and contradictions that resulted when “different cultures [came] into 
continuous first-hand contact”. Linton’s project meant money for Columbia graduate students to 
research this theme among several Native American groups for their Ph.D. dissertations.
16
 Harris 
was assigned the White Knife Shoshoni of the Duck Valley Reservation in remote Owyhee, 
northern Nevada, where he arrived with his wife Martha in June, 1937.
17
 
The Western Shoshoni were of great contemporary anthropological interest and importance 
(Thomas, Pendleton, and Cappannari 1986). Harris’s publications on the White Knives, 
emphasising subsistence strategies in a harsh environment, betray his materialist perspective (Harris 
1938, 1940a). “Acculturation here”, he wrote to his Columbia mentor Ruth Benedict, “is most 
unexciting”, but he gathered data for Linton’s project nonetheless.18 Unable immediately to engage 
informants or interpreters because the reservation’s residents were busy in the hayfields, Harris 
consulted files in the local office of the federal Indian Affairs bureau, “dusting off the historical 
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background and learning agency administration”. Access to these records and the assistance of the 
bureau’s agent in Owyhee, Emmett McNeilly, were authorised in an official letter that Harris 
obtained from Washington with Benedict’s help.19 Harris was cautious, however, of associating too 
closely with whites; he refused an offer to live “with the minister – a young, bewildered guy” 
because he “did not want to jeopardize [his] relations with the Indians”.20 He later concluded that 
the White Knives’ “attitude towards white civilization … [was] marked with mild approval and 
resignation”, with only “a thin layer of disapproval, mainly from the older people”.21 Yet it was 
“from the minds of [these] tired old men” that he “had to extract information” (Yelvington 2008, 
459). Finding a “right smart informant … willing to talk … but not at the expense of letting his 
forty acres shift for itself”, Harris paid a third person to work part-time for the informant.22 This 
was an expensive but efficient research strategy, and Benedict later commended Harris’s 
resourcefulness and “good judgment” in “the emergencies of primitive field work”.23 Co-operating 
with local officials, combining documentary research with first-hand experience and observation, 
political acumen and practicality in unfamiliar settings, were ethnographic fieldwork skills that he 
would later employ in the intelligence field. 
 
Figure 1: Harris (on the left) with an informant during fieldwork in the summer of 1937. Photo 
courtesy of Jonathan Harris.  
  
 While writing up his Ph.D. dissertation, Harris won SSRC funding for fieldwork among the 
Igbo in eastern Nigeria.
24
 He had told Herskovits he was interested in peoples of African descent in 
Latin America or the Caribbean but wanted to research an African society first. Herskovits agreed 
that this would provide “more information concerning the background of New World Negroes”. 
Once “immersed … in that living, vibrant Ibo culture going on under [his] nose”, Harris “ignored” 
the emphasis on Africanist research as primarily about “establishing the cultural baseline for the 
Afro-Americas”, but, as Herskovits predicted, it was the most convincing justification for studying 
an African society to propose to the SSRC.
25
 
En route to Nigeria in late 1938, Harris stopped in England to equip himself for his 
fieldwork, speak to scholars and former Nigerian officials, and collect permissions and letters of 
introduction.
26
 In Cambridge he reconnected with Jack Trevor, who had already “been princely” in 
writing on Harris’s behalf to his friend G.I. Jones, the district officer (DO) in Bende, where Harris 
intended basing himself. Jones had responded directly to Harris “in the friendliest terms”, offering 
“his place as a headquarters” and assistance “smoothing over the rough spots” during Harris’s first 
weeks in Nigeria.
27
 Jones, whom Harris, once in Nigeria, “found to be not only a charming host, but 
intelligently interested in anthropology”,28 helped Harris locate a suitable village, Ozuitem, in 
Bende District, have a house built there, and meet informants (Yelvington 2008, 459). As with 
McNeilly, the Indian Affairs agent in Nevada, Jones was someone Harris needed to keep on side in 
Nigeria. Here too, however, he sought distance from “other whites”, contracting with Jones that the 
DO himself would stay away from Ozuitem “so that the natives [would not] have cause to associate 
[Harris] with those who bring with them a chain of unpleasant connotations”.29 
 Ozuitem tested Harris’s resourcefulness and political faculties far more than Owyhee. His 
arrival coincided with rumours – fueled by the impending war and the British-American Tobacco 
Company’s activities in southern Nigeria – that Britain might cede Nigeria to the United States. To 
prevent his presence encouraging anti-colonial agitation, British officials asked Harris to conceal 
his nationality. He consented, but within two days of relocating to Ozuitem he was “answering 
[Igbos’] questions about America”.30 The difficulty was that his “servants couldn’t help knowing 
[he] was an American”, which only multiplied the rumours until he convinced the authorities “that 
it would be better to tell the people the truth”.31 Harris’s work in Nigeria depended not only on his 
skill in understanding the Ozuitem community, but also on a willingness to appear to accommodate 




 While Ozuitem residents worried his arrival was a “cuss” portending “new tax levies or 
land-absorption schemes”,32 Harris delighted in what he styled “a virile, flourishing primitive 
community” for whom “all the ‘bizarre’ things” anthropologists studied had immediate 
significance, and did not, as in Owyhee, “have to [be] beat[en] out of the minds of old, tired 
informants”.33 Some village men soon invited him to join them in their agricultural labour, which 
“greatly pleased” him for had he suggested it himself “they might be suspicious of [his] motives”.34 
The villagers may really have wanted to keep Harris under observation while they worked, but he 
now had an opportunity to earn their confidence. Having briefly tried being British, he possibly 
perceived the research benefits of “acting” Ozuitem, but the vigorous local life also appealed to his 
pride in performing demanding physical labour. He described to Benedict his relish for village 
activities: 
 
I like to get out and work with them, to take off my shirt and trousers and in a loincloth and 
towel about my neck cut the thick bush on their farms with a matchet, for the ants are 
murderous and clothes therefore impossible and with every three strokes of the matchet goes a 




Preparedness to adopt another’s loincloth, so to speak, bettered Harris’s understanding of the 
practical, material concerns of agrarian life, and would similarly serve him later as an intelligence 
agent. 
Sharing their work, Harris cultivated relationships with the villagers. These 
relationshipscharmed him personally and situated his interlocutors in larger social units and patterns 
of activity. At night, he was “thronged with native friends” who spoke as “never … before to a 
white man”.36 Treated as a full human being, he was asked to participate in dances and festivities, to 
marry his male informants’ sisters and daughters, and to share in their sexual banter.37 A month 
after coming to Ozuitem, he believed his friendship with one informant, Ezeala, sufficiently 
established for Ezeala “to reveal to [him] faithfully each day the economic activities of 5 families in 
his ezi”.38 An ezi was a compound of loosely-related households – Harris called it an “extended 
family” – comprising some 50 to 200 individuals who recognised the authority of one of the 
household heads. There were 85 such compounds in Ozuitem and Harris hoped to analyse several 
others, but he believed that Ezeala’s “just about cover[ed] the range of Ozuitem life”.39 Substantial 
portions of his Nigerian field notes documented the daily activities of members of Ezeala’s ezi in a 
methodical format that prepared him for the systematic surveillance of individuals and political 
reporting that intelligence work required.
40
 Similarly, his letters to Benedict and Herskovits, 
disclosing broader reflective perspectives on his anthropological research, read like his later pouch 
letters to OSS’s Africa Desk covering items on specific events and suspects from the intelligence 
field. 
Harris’s friendships with both British officials and Ozuitem residents afforded insights into 
individual financial obligations and marital and household economic responsibilities in a colonial 
context. For a fee, and having reassured himself that his “material would serve as a corrective for 
what otherwise might be misadministration” and could not “conceivably be used in the exploitation 
of the natives”, he was prepared to share his knowledge of the local economy with the government. 
To an Agriculture Department officer desiring crop and livestock improvement, Harris detailed 
“highly pertinent…obstacles…practically unknown to him”: “the political and economic 
importance of women, the magico-religious farming beliefs, [and] the ceremonial importance of 
both men’s and women’s crops”.41 Well before becoming an intelligence agent, Harris was 





Figure 2: Harris shortly after arriving at Bende in southeastern Nigeria in 1938. Photo courtesy of 
Jonathan Harris.  
 
When he left Nigeria in late 1939, Harris had demonstrated an ability to insert himself 
plausibly at points across the colonial spectrum, from Ozuitem agriculturalists to British officials, 
who deemed his presence “fortunate” and wrote admiringly of his having “obtained the confidence 
of the natives to an astonishing degree”. 42 His participation in local patterns of labour and sociality 
revealed a preparedness to take seriously the interests of those he encountered in the field and to 
redefine his tasks in light of local relations of power. It also drew on personal predispositions like 
his pleasure in physical work and his capacity for friendship. His publications showed a concern 
with the day-to-day problems of making a living, economic planning and budgeting, the sexual 
division of labour and women’s roles, and the affective and material sources of Ozuitem Igbos’ 
attachment to the land (Harris 1940b, 1942a, 1943, 1944). At the Association for the Study of 
Negro Life and History’s annual meeting in late 1942, his study of slavery in Nigeria (Harris 
1942b) was announced runner-up for the prize for the best article published that year in the Journal 
of Negro History (see the notice in the Journal of Negro History 1943). Harris was not present to 
hear it; he was back in Nigeria, but for a different purpose. 
 
Making of the Intelligence Officer 
 
In September, 1940, Harris became an instructor in anthropology and sociology, and a year later an 
assistant professor of anthropology, at Ohio State University.
43
 The US entry into the war in 
December 1941 interrupted this academic career. In January, 1942, helped by Bunche, Harris and 
his friend Bascom, another former Herskovits student, procured interviews at the Office of the 
Coordinator of Information (COI) in Washington.
44
 The COI, established by President Roosevelt in 
July, 1941, was conceived variously as a clearing-house for information bearing on national 
security produced by other agencies; an independent collector and analyser of foreign intelligence 
that the State Department and armed services overlooked; and a counter-espionage and special 
operations organization. Reincarnated as OSS in June, 1942, it increasingly focused on the second 
and third remits, which particularly appealed to its action-oriented head, William J. Donovan. 
Generously financed and permissively audited, COI expanded quickly but unsystematically (Brown 
1976, 9-11, 42-49).  
The two Nigerianists – Bascom did fieldwork among the Yoruba in 1937-38 – 
volunteered to serve together. They argued that they might be particularly useful as intelligence-
gatherers drawing on their professional identity as anthropologists for cover.
45
 Their claims 
evidently convinced, for both were invited to work for COI under the guise of carrying out an 
anthropological study, co-sponsored by Ohio State and Northwestern Universities, on 
“acculturation” among the Igbo and Yoruba;46 they thus joined numbers of other anthropologists 
the organization was hiring (Price 2008, 220-261; Harris and Bascom are discussed on 244-248). 
Harris and Bascom became part of a large intelligence-gathering operation that employed a 
number of academics throughout its hierarchy in research and analysis roles (Katz 1989). 
 
 
Figure 3: The letter of authorization of 28 January 1942 by Ohio State University’s president 
Howard L. Bevis providing an academic cover for Harris’s and Bascom’s activities. Source:  
Carton 37, Folder 2, William R. Bascom Papers, BANC MSS 82/163 c, The Bancroft Library, 
University of California, Berkeley. Used with permission.  
 
Harris and Bascom justified their employment in a February, 1942 document explaining 




controlled territories, and producing valuable raw materials, Nigeria was critical to the Allies in 
West Africa, a region which vitally resupplied the North African war theatre. Nigerian 
production rested “upon the native population”, whose size moreover had “potential … for 
military enterprises”. Thus “native morale” was paramount, but “British officials ha[d] failed to 
comprehend native attitudes and opinions”, causing “grievances”. Anthropologists like 
themselves – “trained especially” to study African opinions, with proven “cordial and 
cooperative” relations with Europeans and Africans at “all levels of Nigerian society” – were 
needed to “plan effective counter-active measures” against Axis propaganda, to access 
intelligence from migrants and traders travelling to and from adjacent colonies, and to 
communicate “vital information” timeously to Washington.47  
 
Figure 4: Harris in Washington, DC, in the spring of 1942 before leaving for Nigeria. Photo 
courtesy of Jonathan Harris.  
 
 In April, 1942, Harris and Bascom left for the field under the code names Kenneth Wilson 
and Robert Vaugh(a)n. Their approved objectives, based substantially on their own claims, included 
developing contacts with Africans in Nigeria and its neighbours to obtain sensitive information, 
especially concerning the Vichy French territories; discovering “secret enemy activity” in Nigeria; 
studying how the United States could expand its intelligence capacity in Nigeria should the need 
arise; and creating an operation that would allow others to replace them in time.
48
 Harris later wrote 
that he and Bascom were “amateur bunglers in the field of intelligence” (Lawler 2002, 135, citing 
personal communication from Harris of 21 December 1995). It was naive thinking they could 
implement their plans independently of or without antagonising the British, who were however 
notified of their mission.
49
 But their optimism reflected the ambience of urgency and possibility 
within COI in early 1942. 
 Despite their anthropological training and previous experience in Nigeria, the two men 
struggled to set up after arriving in Lagos in May, 1942. Well-equipped for the ethnographic field, 
but ill-prepared for the changes the war had wrought, they reported that they could not obtain the 
car or radio supplies central to their project.
50
 Washington’s response illustrates the early 
COI/OSS’s financial strengths but logistical limitations: while headquarters readily advanced the 
agents’ agreed expenses for six months,51 the requested car – a 1941 Pontiac Station Wagon – was 
not shipped until September, 1942 and then sunk en route.
52
 After seven “expensive and annoyingly 
inactive” weeks in which they also failed to secure a residential base in overcrowded Lagos, 
Bascom announced that he would move west to Badagry near the Dahomean border to “begin [the] 
actual work” of reporting on Vichy French colonies; by then, he and Harris had bought a used car, 
which would get him there.
53
 Harris meanwhile flew northwards to Kano, close to Niger. Both 
agents were soon sending back by weekly air pouch “a sizeable quantity” of “the most detailed sort 
of information”, which headquarters considered “most gratifying”.54 
 Washington’s gratification depended on its agents’ skills in establishing productive 
exchanges with headquarters itself, with representatives of other Allied organizations in the field, 
and with African informants. Poor communication with Washington – another feature of 
organizational incipience – had crippled the effectiveness of Erwin H Watts.55 Watts, trained in 
code and “indoctrinated” in Special Operations (SO), had the cover of Special Assistant to the US 
Consul in Lagos,
56
 a title that Harris, discarding his previous cover, himself adopted when setting 
up office in the consulate in August, 1942.
57
 Watts was supposed to prepare the ground for an SO 
team assigned to engage in subversion, the restriction of Axis agents’ activities, and the cutting of 
Axis supply lines.
58
 This was a fanciful brief for the men sent out, who, disguised as Pan American 
Airways employees, were confined largely to Accra, far from Watts in Lagos. Unable to understand 
his role in this operation – still in planning even after his recall and five months after the men had 





 Aubrey Hutcheson, touring West Africa in the third quarter of 1942, reporting on OSS’s 
field agents and recommending organizational changes, prized Watts’s “contacts with which one 
can practically get anything done … from secret information to buying matches”. Hutcheson had 
“never seen a more perfect case of misunderstanding between a field man and the home office”.60 
For Harris, working closely alongside Hutcheson in Lagos, Watts’s experience was a valuable 
lesson, and Harris himself praised Watts’s “wholehearted efforts” and “extremely co-operative” and 
“highly effective” manner.61 
 While effective communication with Washington was essential, establishing good 
relationships in the field was paramount, as Harris and Bascom discovered in attempting 
independent undercover research along Nigeria’s Vichy borders. Although better prepared to 
engage with Africans than many other Americans – or Europeans – of their time, they were clearly 
identifiable as outsiders. Given the paucity of whites in West Africa, their appearance alone singled 
them out. Their cover possibly convinced other Westerners, but Harris’s experiences in Ozuitem 
illustrate that gaining Africans’ trust was difficult. Moreover, while both had successfully 
conducted smaller-scale anthropological research, they had no guidance on managing relationships 
in enough localities to obtain useful information. Above all, their activities risked competing with or 
duplicating those of their British allies. And contrary to the assumptions in their February, 1942 
document, the British had built on their administration in Nigeria to produce good intelligence. As 
Hutcheson delicately put it, the British had “every good native in their employ”.62 
Difficulties of access, communication and conspicuousness, and an entrenched British 
intelligence organization, compelled the two anthropologists to redefine their objectives. Harris in 
particular cultivated members of the various, then still haphazardly coordinated, British intelligence 
agencies in Nigeria, and studied the politics of their interrelationships.
63
 Much of the gratifyingly 
detailed information that he and Bascom sent to Washington originated from these British sources.
64
 
Hutcheson’s mission, to negotiate OSS representatives’ status as liaison officers in Allied-
controlled West African territories, confirmed Washington’s recognition of the expediency of 
intelligence collaboration with the British.
65
 Here Harris’s ethnographic field skills in forming 
relationships with both rulers and ruled served him well, certainly compared to Bascom, who was 
recalled in August 1942 because he “had failed to get along satisfactorily with the British”,66 who 
“definitely [did] not like him and [would] not cooperate fully with him”, which left Bascom “in an 
untenable position”.67 Bascom left OSS in October, 1942.68 
After Bascom’s departure, Harris – under his new cover at the US Consulate in Lagos, and 
with his advocacy of more open co-operation (“liaison”) with the British intelligence services 
endorsed by Hutcheson
69
 – was given more focused “prime directives”. These included supplying 
information about cross-border enemies; counter-espionage; and analysing “factors impeding the 
war effort”. Much of this involved his sourcing information from the British as OSS’s “chief 
Nigerian man”, and observing and commenting upon the relations among the British agencies that 
produced this information.
70
 Harris’s task involved managing a field in which he had limited direct 
access to the most immediate intelligence sources, and therefore understanding where and by whom 




Harris’s fieldwork in Owyhee and Ozuitem gave him a lead among his OSS colleagues in 
understanding the incumbent authorities. As an ethnographer, he strove to cultivate “confidence of 
the most intimate sort” in informants,71 a quality which in the intelligence field helped Harris adjust 
from the position of moral superiority articulated in his and Bascom’s February, 1942 document to 
the role of junior partner to the British. Building on his familiarity with their social repertoire and 
his capacity for friendship, Harris sought to draw his British informants to him through a careful 




reports to Washington, like his letters to Benedict and Herskovits from his ethnographic research 
contexts, adopted a mode of self-presentation and recognition which cast his British opposites as 
anthropological subjects. 
This ethnographic engagement paralleled other American anthropologists’ interest in their 
ally. Margaret Mead, Benedict’s close associate, conducted sustained field research into the “ethos” 
of British culture. Wanting to aid wartime co-operation through mutual understanding, and 
theoretically interested in psychological factors shaping national character, Mead travelled through 
Britain in 1943, taking notes much as she had in Samoa, New Guinea or Bali (Mandler 2009b). 
Such practice challenges the notion of colonial-era anthropology as necessarily implicated in power 
differentials between “natives” and rational observers. In Nigeria, Harris sought knowledge already 
constituted as rational from parties whose position vis-à-vis him was not primarily defined by 
difference. Although asymmetrical in some respects, his relationship with the British also reflected 
a largely shared ontology and mutual political interests. Harris’s use of ethnography, like Mead’s, to 
establish the British as invested in a mutual endeavour, illuminates anthropology’s practical 
potential for encounter, negotiation and collaboration.  
Harris’s thoughts on the qualities needed in prospective OSS agents in Nigeria resemble 
methodological passages in his field journals. Plausible cover, he wrote, required agents’ having 
professional backgrounds as “scientists” – medicinal plant collectors, linguists, economists – and 
therefore longer-term reasons to be in West Africa “without exciting too much suspicion”. In their 
training and by inclination, many colonial officers pursued similar studies and “could readily smell 
out a phony”.72 While operationally valuable, Harris’s assessment of the British as informants was 
empathic; he admitted admiring the “intellectual excitement” of many colonial officers (Edelman 
1997, 10; Yelvington 2008, 462).  
Manners and social standing mattered too. In 1938, Harris had wondered “[w]hy in hell” he 
needed a “tuxedo” and could not “travel second class to Nigeria”.73 In 1942, however, he explained 
that OSS operatives had to exhibit the public habits of the colonial officer class. One description of 
typically unsuitable behaviour from colonial officers’ perspective shows Harris’s abilities as a 
closely observant anthropologist in his intelligence work: 
  
... no matter how well trained in our work or in scientific work, [agents] must have the knack 
of getting on with other Europeans; they must observe the social graces upon which much 
stress is placed here so please do not send one who farts, belches or picks his nose or teeth in 




His empathy with the colonisers did not preclude sensitivity to the feelings of their African subjects. 
Washington, Harris advised, should “not send any Southerners”, for Nigerians were “quick to 
discern antagonisms in manner and speech”, which would cost OSS “their cooperation”.75 Harris 
himself rented a house in Yaba, a predominantly African neighbourhood, away from the 
“European” parts of Lagos and the consular offices. Given his enjoyment socialising in Ozuitem, 
this was not eccentric in itself, and may have facilitated his access to African opinion. It was, 
however, “the only [house] to be had”, and his description of the neighbourhood as “[u]nfortunately 
… mixed” reflects OSS agents’ privileging of relations with the British, who did not endorse easy 
integration, over relations with their allies’ African subjects. This contrasted with the distance 
Harris kept from whites in Owyhee and Ozuitem.
76
  
  Harris’s ethnographic insights into the manners and priorities of his British counterparts 
aided his appraisal of their information and methods. Interacting with representatives of a dozen 
uncoordinated British intelligence outfits in Lagos, Harris observed that the reputations of two of 
these representatives as “intellectual lightweight[s]” meant that they seemed inefficient and 
received little professional assistance from others. In attending to how personal regard influenced 
the flow of information, Harris identified an important factor in British institutional politics while 
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also accessing the most productive intelligence.
77
 His success as an intelligence agent drew on the 
interpersonal and observational skills that had served him equally well as an anthropologist.
 While the British had information that flowed more readily to Americans who observed 
their protocols, they did not have OSS’s abundant access to money, equipment, and facilities. 
Material exchanges are important in ethnographic settings too, and Harris knew how to insert them 
in his intelligence relationships without evoking sensitivities. For example, he secured from 
Washington “a dozen National Geographic maps … to be distributed among our British friends in 
West Africa for good-will purposes”.78 Later, from South Africa, he reported that “one must hold up 
his share of entertaining … to continue in the round of the people and officials and friends from 
whom information is obtained”.79 For this and other aspects of Harris’s South African mission, OSS 
provided him with a “task fund” of $18,700 ($259,700 in 2016 dollars).80 He understood however 
that more personal, smaller gestures of generosity were “of real help” professionally, and asked 
Washington for items “impossible to get” in South Africa, including vitamin pills, jazz records, and 
“about 2 dozen good quality” lipsticks, which would “be about the best builders of good will and 
gratitude in the proper quarters than any other single item”.81  
 Emphasizing the war’s disciplining impact, Price argues that participation forced 
anthropologists to work in the service of larger bureaucracies and address questions posed by others 
(Price 2008, 50). Harris’s postings, often placing him in positions with few clear instructions, 
illustrate otherwise. Certainly during his Nigerian tour, OSS had still to develop the capacity to 
manage field agents there productively. Yet Harris produced results precisely because he could fall 
back on ethnographic skills enabling him to adopt the perspectives of, and make himself acceptable 
to, his British counterparts, who provided the most useful “native” point of view. That Harris’s 
collaboration with the British was considered successful despite Washington’s initial reservations 
suggests that by relying on an ethnographic understanding of what could be achieved in a particular 
location, anthropologists could also shape bureaucratic practice and procedures. 
 Harris left Nigeria at the end of 1942 after seven months during which OSS was still 
establishing itself. Harris himself remarked, in a letter to Accra from the Africa Desk in Washington 
in early 1943, that as OSS’s “organization bec[ame] stronger” it could “no longer rely upon getting 
total information from the British” – implying that had been the position when he was in the field – 
but would have to reciprocate.
82
 His next field posting presented precisely this challenge, but in 
South Africa too Harris’s ethnographic experience helped situate him in specific localities and in 
relation to institutions and individuals within them. 
 
Operationalizing Intelligence: Towards the Van Rensburg Report 
 
Within weeks of arriving in Southern Africa, Harris, replicating his West African method, 
developed contacts in South African, British and other American agencies – possibly too many, for 
his Washington desk supervisor recommended he “take it easy … [and] eliminate [the] least 
productive liaisons”.83 As in his ethnographic research, however, Harris strove first to gain “a fairly 
rough picture of the whole”84 before focusing his enquiries, and he cultivated connections 
accordingly. At the highest levels, his cover as special assistant to the US minister afforded direct 
access to Lord Harlech, the British High Commissioner, and Douglas David Forsyth, Smuts’s 
permanent secretary and “one of the few Union officials whom the British consider[ed] completely 
sound and discreet”.85 Harris soon saw that South African officials’ sensitivities to the appearance 
of British interference in the country’s internal affairs might affect their view of his associations, 
thereby curtailing his effectiveness. A US naval colleague, taking Harris to meet senior figures in 
the South African military and police, confirmed “emphatically” that it was “far better” that an 
American should make such introductions than “Col. Webster [MI5’s Cape Town representative] or 
any other English officer, since the South Africans were jealous of and did not fully cooperate with 




association with Webster [had] not endear[ed] him to South African officials”.86 As in Nigeria, 
Harris’s ethnographic experience helped him adroitly negotiate the politics of the intelligence-
gathering field. 
 Unlike in Nigeria, however, Harris could not here avoid progressively identifying himself 
with one faction among the Americans’ numerous competing “allies at war” (Furlong 2005). The 
principals of this faction were Michael Ryde, an MI5 agent based in the Union since March, 1943; 
Leonard Hawkins, heading SOE’s mission in southern Africa; and Henry Lenton, South Africa’s 
Controller of Censorship. Ryde, holding Smuts’s authorisation discreetly to investigate the regional 
Axis espionage network provided he left Union nationals alone, had found that all his leads 
implicated Van Rensburg’s OB. Hawkins’s goal was to disrupt the network’s activities in 
Mozambique. For Lenton, a pro-war anglophile with ambitions to direct a national secret 
intelligence organization, Ryde and Hawkins were valuable allies in a campaign to discredit his 
rivals within the South African state, notably Colonel Coetzee, the country’s senior police detective, 
whom all three considered a deliberately obstructive anti-war Afrikaner (Shear 2013). After a heavy 
drinking session with the chief detective, Harris, already briefed about him by Ryde, Hawkins and 
Livingston, independently reported that Coetzee admired Germany (which he had visited before the 
war), and was both “bitterly anti-Semitic” and consistently anti-British.87 In his letter covering this 
report, Harris admitted that liaison was “much closer with the British”, who were “opening up” to 
him, than with the South Africans.
88
 
 Ryde, who quickly became Harris’s closest collaborator, was introduced to him by 
Livingston days after Harris’s arrival in South Africa.89 The following month Harris saw Ryde 
again in Pretoria to discuss information from Washington about a possible U-boat rendezvous with 
the OB to land wireless and sabotage equipment.
90
 They stayed in the same hotel and “got along 
very well”: Ryde was Harris’s “own age” and had “similar likes and dislikes”. Their rapport led 
Ryde to confide to Harris that he was unearthing evidence implicating the OB in German aims 
“affect[ing] the war outside the Union”. This would allow London to show Smuts that the OB was 
not purely his domestic political concern and force him “to completely outlaw” the OB. Ryde, 
“short-handed” and underfunded, promised to share information with Harris obtained from his local 
agents and from London in exchange for Harris’s assistance.91 Their relationship is barely 
perceptible in Ryde’s communications with London; fearful of indiscretions with information 
obtained secretly by decoding German wireless intercepts, London would have disapproved of their 
intimacy. Harris therefore impressed on Washington that nothing he reported about his relationship 
with Ryde should get back to London, which “would be to [Ryde’s] discredit and would, for 
[Harris], dry up this flow of information”.92 
 In early 1944, Harris confirmed his ongoing closeness with Ryde, who kept Harris 
“adequately and even intimately informed of his operations”. Together with Hawkins they met 
frequently, “a governing body of three … thrash[ing] out all intelligence problems”. Harris claimed 
the better part in trading information. Hawkins and Ryde, he wrote, “show me the original 
dispatches from their agents, even though I do not show them mine from Ebert [OSS’s 
representative in Lourenço Marques]”.93 Washington queried whether Harris was “in Ryde’s ‘hip-
pocket’ or vice-versa”, but accepted that he was “getting [his] full share of information under the 
arrangement”. “Your letters”, Washington added, “reveal that you seem to be sitting in on a lot of 
ruling committees these days”.94 The comment implied possibly that Harris overstated his 
significance in the southern African intelligence field, or that he preferred joining others to working 
independently. “I sometimes wonder”, Harris responded, 
 
if you realize how much we have to depend upon the British, at least in this area. For one 
thing they have the charter from Smuts to operate, and we have not. Therefore they have far 
more intelligence opportunities than we have. Furthermore, Ryde and Hawkins receive clues 
and leads from London regarding enemy activities in this area that our representatives do not 
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or cannot receive from Washington, i.e., intercepts of enemy code messages and transcripts of 




Ryde’s “charter” and access to sources convinced Harris that it was “best … for effective moves 
against the enemy” if he supported Ryde in working “his already opened channels”.96 Harris saw 
little sense in “do[ing] a tremendous groundwork” independently, “competing with Ryde, to the 
detriment of the best interests of both [British and US] organisations”.97 
 Harris maintained some critical distance from Ryde, albeit in ways that underlined his 
dependence on him. Thus when Ryde told him that a German wireless station was “no longer 
providing fruitful intercepts”, Harris noted that there was “no way for [him] to check this”.98 Harris 
often gave information from Ryde a relatively high B2 reliability evaluation,
99
 indicating a 
“previously or probably reliable” source and “information supported by other evidence or 
considered probably true”.100 This was not an unconditional endorsement. Methodologically, 
however, developing the “most productive liaison” – establishing “an efficient liaison service” with 
other agencies rather than an independent “intelligence network”, as Washington summarised 
“Harris’ modus operandi”101 – while an intuitive approach neither for a field intelligence agent nor 
the anthropologist Harris had become in the 1930s, was plausible given his shallow cover in an 
ostensibly friendly territory part of whose population sympathised with the enemy. And as in 
Nigeria it did draw on his professional anthropologist’s skill in cultivating informants. 
 It was plausible too because Harris, Ryde, and Hawkins were pressured by time. The 
Mediterranean had reopened to Allied shipping, reducing Southern Africa’s strategic significance, 
and MI5 and SOE were contemplating withdrawing altogether from South Africa. Expecting their 
imminent recall, Harris’s British colleagues planned with him to “launch an all-out attack against 
the enemy organisations”.102 Their success would partly accomplish Harris’s own mission. Joining 
them, however, entailed adopting some of their perspectives – particularly their assessments, and 
“likes and dislikes”, of local officials. Failure risked leaving him exposed after their departure – 
vulnerable to being disappointed by the vacating partners’ local friends if he sought support against 
their enemies. This was the danger in Harris’s not developing his own local relationships and 
contacts and depending on other outsiders like Ryde to mediate his access to information and sub-
agents. Local informants would be the more valuable because the British would take with them their 
access to decoded wireless and cable intercepts, which so far had made Harris for Washington a 
more effective reporter on Axis activities in southern Africa than he otherwise might have been. 
 The stakes in accessing Britain’s “most secret sources” rose sharply following Ryde’s 
departure. Lenton, the hitherto helpful censorship head, now viewed Harris as a rival for “sole 
contact with the London services”. Lenton, Harris believed, saw him “as the only outside agent with 
power whom he cannot control … and … a threat to the position which he wishes to display in the 
eyes of the Union authorities, namely, chief of all intelligence”.103 Washington, although agreeing 
that Lenton’s antagonism was “bad news”, responded phlegmatically. It had expected that with 
Ryde would also go the “very satisfactory” co-operation “so well cemented” on the basis of “field 
relationships”. Harris’s “British Brothers … would close down on information of much significance 
being passed along” to him and “[p]erhaps [he would] want to reduce them to the relationship of 
cousin”. And he also had to “realize the South African viewpoint”, which feared “amateur or 
professional American SI men finding out too much”.104 
 Lenton may also have resented Harris’s cultivation of Lenton’s own “chief undercover 
man”, Harry Posner, on whom Ryde, with Lenton’s blessing, had come to rely for local assistance 
in the absence of police co-operation. Posner was loathed by the police for exposing its Cape Town 
deputy commissioner for having “as his mistress a suspect German agent”.105 Coetzee and the 
police, learning of Ryde and Posner’s connection, “got on to” Ryde, “determined to run him out of 
business”.106 They succeeded when Coetzee alleged (substantially correctly) in April, 1944 that 




thereby violating the condition Smuts had placed on MI5’s mandate. Only the intervention of Lord 
Harlech and Justice Minister Steyn forestalled Ryde’s arrest and he quickly left the country, 
permanently ending MI5’s presence in South Africa.107 Harris, who participated in the April, 1944 
operation – part of the failed “all-out attack” planned with Ryde and Hawkins – had hoped to 
succeed Ryde in working with Posner, who appeared to know more about Afrikaner extremists 
“than any other individual or organisation”.108 But Lenton’s “changing attitude” and the police heat 
on Posner frustrated this possibility.
109
 
 Harris’s chance to interview Van Rensburg – right when his initially most “productive 
liaisons” had fallen away, but before he could cultivate new contacts – was thus particularly 
opportune. Indeed, the interview with Van Rensburg represented a culmination of Harris’s career as 
an intelligence agent that drew deeply on the resources of his ethnographic training. Although 
continuing afterwards to develop other means to complete the task of unravelling the OB-German 
axis, Harris was hemmed in by Washington’s unwillingness to endorse this task unambiguously 
given Lenton’s withdrawal of co-operation. Washington feared that like Ryde he would “jeopardize 
[his] cover position” by placing himself “in a position where the local officials [could] point their 
finger at [him] as a meddler in [their] affairs”.110 Interviewing Van Rensburg – unlike accessing 
government files on internees and suspected subversives that Justice Minister Steyn had explicitly 
denied Harris sight of for “local political” reasons111 – did not entail this risk. 
Harris and Stephens were not the first Americans to interview the OB leader. In November, 
1943, Harlan Clark, a career foreign service official and Middle East specialist,
112
 but based then in 
Pretoria as the US Legation’s Third Secretary, spent an evening at Van Rensburg’s farm. He typed 
up this “bizarre” experience the next day in an eleven-page memorandum describing the OB’s 
“singular workings” and its leaders’ “medieval approach … to 20th Century problems”. He 
discussed the demeanour and political views of Van Rensburg’s acolytes, and the leader’s own 
assessments of the war and German intentions, of Smuts’s government, and of the scope of the 
OB’s subversion, sabotage and state infiltration. Harris, who thought Clark “extremely bright”,113 
admired the document, which in outline, from its details of how Clark was invited to meet Van 
Rensburg and of his conversations with the underling who transported him, to its vignettes of the 
personalities he encountered, modelled Harris and Stephens’s report of their own interview with the 




Although resembling Clark’s, Harris’s report with Stephens, produced over five weeks, was 
far more carefully composed. It was also longer, with subtitled analytical sections – “Ideological 
Basis of the O.B.”, “Relationship to Germany”, “Sabotage and Violence: Safety of Van Rensburg’s 
Position”, “The Nationalist Party and the O.B.”, “Natives”, etc. – indicative of its greater breadth 
and depth. As in Harris’s research articles, its close observation of people, surroundings and 
incidents drew on his facility for recording ethnographic detail. A full paragraph described the 
impression created by Van Rensburg’s initial appearance, including his demeanour, speech, size, 
dress and hair (“close-cropped, German style”). Van Rensburg’s nervous conversational manner 
when seated was deftly conveyed in a description of his “[c]hain-smoking … fumbl[ing] repeatedly 
with matches, flick[ing] ashes when there were no ashes to flick, and on several occasions 
dropp[ing] his cigarette”.  
 
Figure 5: Van Rensburg and Anderson holding the OB flag. Photo by Hart Preston/The LIFE 
Picture Collection/Getty Images. 
 
Consistent with their intention to produce new incriminating knowledge that would impel 
Smuts to curb the OB, Harris and Stephens quoted Van Rensburg directly and at length expounding 
his admiration of Germany and Hitler; the OB’s “revolutionary role” in bringing about national 
socialism in South Africa; his followers’ acts of robbery, sabotage, and violence against informers; 
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his desire to recruit demobilised soldiers; and his contempt for his constitutionalist rivals for 
leadership of the Afrikaner nationalist cause. Their opening theme – the “anomal[y]” of South 
African Nazis thriving “unchecked” by a government whose overthrow they sought for sending 
soldiers “to destroy the Nazis of Europe” – was revisited often in an apparent effort to shame Smuts 
for his forbearance. The Americans pointedly observed, for instance, that they met their driver, Van 
Rensburg’s lieutenant Anderson, at a Pretoria building that housed army offices alongside the OB’s. 
And the OB leader boasted “slyly” that he had followers among the close relatives or even 
bodyguards of senior government figures, who knew that if they were “foolish enough to put [him] 
into prison … at least five cabinet ministers … would be killed or at least badly beaten up that same 
night” (Harris quoting Van Rensburg). Van Rensburg, Harris and Stephens concluded, was “a 
shrewd, cunning, intelligent man who as long as he remain[ed] at liberty constitute[d] a menace to 
any democratic [sic] government in the Union”. While “South Africa could never constitute the 
same threat to world security as Nazism in Germany[,] it [might] one day constitute a troublesome, 
festering sore on the anatomy of the new world [the Allies] hope[d] to build after th[e] war”.115 
 The Van Rensburg report did not have the full effect upon Smuts that Harris wanted; the 
prime minister neither proscribed the OB nor arrested its leader. However, his government’s tone in 
handling extremist anti-war Afrikaner nationalist movements noticeably hardened in the second half 
of 1944, for which Harris received credit. Harry Lawrence – who as Justice Minister after the war 
pursued Van Rensburg, such that the OB leader “lived in fear of being charged with high treason” 
and began to draft his legal defense, including a speech from the dock (Marx 2008, 521; van der 
Schyff 1991, 262-266) – praised the report. The Director of Military Intelligence “was extremely 
grateful” to Harris because he himself had long tried “to needle Smuts … in taking a firm line with 
van Rensburg”, and the report “add[ed] fire to the new born government campaign of publicity and 
action against the Ossewabrandwag and other Nazi-type groups”.116 A copy was lodged in MI5’s 
file on Van Rensburg,
117
 and the OSS’s official history noted its contribution to the cabinet’s bolder 
policy (Brown 1976, 174). Harris was proud of his efforts (see Yelvington 2008, 464). Finally, 
George Cloete Visser – a police detective with the team Smuts sent to Europe in 1946 under 
Lawrence Barrett, the Law Officer for Union War Prosecutions, to study captured German 
documents and collect evidence from internees leading to South Africans (beginning with Van 
Rensburg) being charged with treason – considered the report so insightful that he reproduced it in 
full in his book on the OB. Barrett’s report was not ready until the end of 1947, however, and with 
an impending election Smuts’s cabinet decided not to act on it. The Nationalists, in power from 
May, 1948, unsurprisingly took no action themselves but diligently ensured that every copy of 
Barrett’s report was accounted for (Visser 1976, 148-185, 193-194, 197-199; Lawrence 1978, 183; 




Harris’s grounding in ethnographic practice, and self-identification as an anthropologist, remained 
with him throughout his OSS years. Familiarising himself with anthropology in southern Africa, he 
later published a short report based partly on his impressions while resident there (Harris 1947). In 
July, 1944, he wrote to his mentor Herskovits, possibly for the first time since arriving in South 
Africa, saying how “far away from [his] life” anthropology seemed. Yet anthropology’s “problems” 
were “the ugliest ones” South Africa faced, “fantastic problems which demand bold, unequivocal 
answers”. And with his recent visit to the OB leader surely in mind, he concluded that “[o]nly the 
foes of democracy here meet the issue squarely but their answer is the same one we’ve learned to 
hate”. Right then, completing the report on his interview with Van Rensburg, a task requiring him 
to draw deeply on his academic background, Harris could hardly have been closer to anthropology 






Harris’s confidence that anthropology might shape state policy in an anti-fascist and anti-
racist direction was particularly evident during his South African tour. While his British colleagues 
and Washington handlers feared upsetting the South African status quo, Harris’s approach to the 
OB reflected a politics mediated by a specifically anthropological disposition. Racism had been 
exposed as unscientific by the leaders – not least Herskovits himself – of the discipline in which he 
had trained. Hemmed in by the constraints of the intelligence field, Harris’s anthropological skills 
enabled him to adduce further evidence. The Van Rensburg report reflects a profound grasp of 
context rooted in ethnographic methodologies including physical presence and risk, and systematic 
observation with a view to obtaining the “native’s” point of view. While the report was not as 
sympathetic to the “natives” it studied as advocated by Boas’s cultural relativism, it challenged the 
OSS and Smuts’s government by drawing on explicitly anthropological values and forms of 
knowledge. The production of the report and its impact on South African politics point to the limits 
of discourses centering on anthropology’s complicity with power. 
Despite anthropology’s explicitly anti-racist focus in the interwar years, Harris’s research 
was from the outset shaped by methods that reveal anthropology as a form of governmentality and 
his positionality anticipated later debates on the politics of ethnography (e.g., Behar and Gordon 
1995; Clifford and Marcus 1986; Harrison 1991). His Ph.D. on the White Knife Shoshoni drew on 
material held by the Bureau of Indian Affairs. His study of the Igbo in Nigeria relied on 
collaboration with British administrators, and eventually even informed colonial agricultural policy. 
Harris’s service in the intelligence field might seem an incremental extension of this earlier work; 
his and Bascom’s February, 1942 memorandum suggests he initially understood it so himself. 
However, Harris’s career as an anthropologist and intelligence agent also indicates the 
complexities of directly comparing ethnographic method in the two roles. In the former, his 
consistent maintenance of distance from local administrators reflects Harris’s awareness of, and 
unease with, the potential complicity of his own position. Presenting himself in one way to the 
people studied and in another to those associated with the larger interests defining the field, he was 
conscious of occupying a “duplex” position (Pels 2008, 293). But unlike a spy, he adopted this 
position in good faith towards both sides. Providing information on Igbo agricultural practices to 
the colonial government oriented Harris as a mediator ensuring greater government consideration of 
local interests. This was ethnography as an “open-ended ethics of negotiation”, albeit within 
existing relations of power (Pels 2008, 294). Practised in the more exigent intelligence field, these 
ethics of negotiation proved productive among enemies and allies alike. 
Harris’s ethnographic exposé of Van Rensburg and the OB may appear to re-establish the 
asymmetrical categories often associated with colonial anthropology. It does offer a perspective on 
a “native” group where ethnographer and reader are ostensibly positioned as rational observers. 
Harris’s ethnographic analysis of the OB, however, sought neither salvage nor domination within a 
framework of governmentality, but rather to intervene in the domestic and international politics of 
wartime South Africa. As in interactions with his British opposites, Harris’s engagement with the 
OB was less distorted by epistemological differences than colonial anthropological encounters. But 
the racist ideology of the OB, itself at odds with the anti-racist ethics of anthropology, legitimated 
Harris’s unsympathetic portrayal of the group and its leaders. Taking Van Rensburg seriously as a 
political force, Harris perceived his ethnography confronting a powerful political adversary by 
provoking Smuts’s government to action. His report, and indeed his repertoire of ethnographic 
practice, show anthropology’s core methodology of personal engagement directly engaging and 
challenging wider relations of power. At the same time, Harris’s case suggests how anthropologists 
in their various guises have often despite their discipline’s self-representations had to mediate 
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